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JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN CALIFORNIA
By ROBERT G. MEINERS*
Introduction
Where California should have legislation to insure workers the right to
choose a union by the democratic designation of the majority, we find empti-
ness. Of all the great industrial states of the Union, California alone pro-
vides no procedure for a majority choice of the workers.'
At Governor Brown's request, a bill was introduced in the last session
of the legislature to eliminate this emptiness and to solve several other
problems. The bill would have repealed the present Jurisdictional Strike
Act' and replaced it with a new approach. It will be the purpose of this
article to examine this new approach. Although the bill did not pass, it is of
importance because a similar attempt will almost surely be made in the
next session of the legislature.
Present Law a Hodge-Podge
The wisdom of anything less than a complete revision of the existing
California Labor Code dealing with collective bargaining may well be
questioned. As it presently exists, the code is a hodge-podge of fragments
collected from here and there and put together with little or no cohesiveness.
For example, we find language taken from various sections of the Norris-
La Guardia Act3 appearing under the heading "Contracts Against Public
Policy."4 We may also find two different parts of Taft-Hartley5 joined
together as one incongruous whole in the present Jurisdictional Strike Act.'
Viewing the present state of affairs realistically, there appears to be little
chance of an over-all revision. However, the attempted Jurisdictional Strike
Bill which will be the principal subject of this discussion did attempt to add
some clarity to the situation.
* A.B. 1950, Muhlenberg College; LL.B. 1956, Dickinson Law School; LL.IV. 1957, Har-
vard Law School. Assistant Professor, University of Santa Clara, College of Law, Santa Clara,
Calif. Member of the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars.
1 Tobriner, Pat Brown's Ideas on Labor Reform, 11 FRONTIER 12 (May 1959). In Governor
Brown's own words, "California has no machinery whereby employees working in intra-state
commerce may select or reject a union as their collective bargaining representative. The result
has been detrimental to the best interests of the employees, of organized labor, of the employers
and of the public itself." Brown, Special Message on Labor Management Relations 7 (Janu-
ary 20, 1959).
2 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-22.
3 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.
4 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 920-23.
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, Public Law 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 US.C.A.
§§ 141-97.
6 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-22. Section in point is § 1118.
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In General
Let us take a look at the bill in general and later look more closely at
some of its provisions which seem to invite closer scrutiny.
In general, in its final form, the bill would amend section 56 of the
Labor Code and increase from eight to ten, the number of divisions within
the Department of Industrial Relations. It would repeal section 65 which
gives the department power to investigate and mediate labor disputes and
add section 160 giving this power to one of the newly created divisions.
This same division would be the administrative agency charged with
administering the new Jurisdictional Strike Act. The present Jurisdictional
Strike Act would be repealed.
The bil 7 declares it to be the public policy of the State of California
that workers shall have full freedom of association, the right to organize,
to bargain collectively and to select their own bargaining representatives.
None of these terms is defined and therein lies one of the bill's most serious
defects. In the concluding sentence of the public policy statement, jurisdic-
tional strikes are declared to be unlawful."
After giving us the only three definitions contained in the entire bill,
i.e. "worker," "employer" and "labor organization," the bill goes into the
question of representation."
Here it is significant to note that the bill treats entirely differently the
two kinds of disputes which our present Jurisdictional Strike Act lumps
together in its definition of a "Jurisdictional Strike" (i.e. (1) representa-
tion disputes-which union shall represent the employees, and (2) work
jurisdiction disputes-which union's members shall perform the job in
question). Governor Brown thought this worthy of special mention in his
special message to the legislature. He pointed out that the present act,"
•.. defines a jurisdictional strike as being, among other things, any con-
certed refusal to perform work or any other concerted interruption of an
employer's operation or business arising out of a controversy between two
or more unions over which of them has or should have the exclusive right
to bargain with an employer on behalf of his employees.
I respectfully submit that this is a representation, not a jurisdictional
dispute. The machinery I have recommended would provide for the resolu-
tion of such a dispute whereas present law merely provides that an injunc-
tion to halt economic action may be sought.
Concerning the question of representation, any labor organization
claiming to represent a majority of the workers in a given unit may file
7 Assembly Bill 419, California Legislature 1959, Regular (General) Session.
8 Id. § 1137.
9 Id. § 1138.
lId. §§ 1139-42.
11 Brown, supra note 1, at 8.
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a representation petition with the newly created division. The division then
investigates this claim and holds such hearings and elections as are neces-
sary. First, the appropriateness of the unit is determined. Then, if a
majority of the workers in the unit desire to be represented by any petition-
ing labor organization, that organization is certified as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of that unit.'
Results of such a certification are twofold:'"
1. The division is precluded from considering a second petition or con-
ducting an election in that unit for either one or two years, depending upon
whether or not a collective bargaining agreement is signed. If such an
agreement is signed, between the certified labor organization and the em-
ployer, no election can be held before the expiration date of said agreement,
but in no event will this period exceed two years. If no agreement is signed,
a certification will bar an election for one year.
2. Any other labor organization is prohibited, during the one or two-
year period, from engaging in striking, picketing or boycotting for the
purpose of obtaining a contract, recognition or soliciting members.
Having thus determined the problem of representation disputes, the bill
then turns to jurisdictional disputes and its definition of such disputes is
confined solely to the question of which of two contesting labor organiza-
tions has the right to have its members perform the work.
Any employer who believes himself to be involved in such a situation
may petition the division for a determination that a jurisdictional strike
exists. So also, any of his workers or any labor organization may file a peti-
tion. Once such a petition is filed, the division must summarily investigate
the claim and, within forty-eight hours, either dismiss the petition or issue a
notice of hearing. If the division does issue such notice, the labor organiza-
tions involved in the dispute must cease striking, picketing, boycotting or
the work stoppage for the period that the division has jurisdiction over the
case. If, as a result of the hearing, the division makes a determination that
a jurisdictional strike does, in fact, exist then the labor organizations
involved are faced with two alternatives:
1. They may by mutual consent, submit the matter for a final and
binding decision to a tribunal of any organization with which they are
affiliated.
2. They may by mutual consent, submit the matter for a final and
binding decision to arbitration, before a mutually acceptable arbitrator.
But what if they accept neither of the two alternatives within seven
days? Then, the bill provides that the division itself determines the work
jurisdiction and issues its final, binding decision.' 4
12Assembly Bill 419, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1139-42. (Hereafter cited as A.B. 419).
13 Id. § 1143.
141d. § 1144.
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Other provisions of the bill include the fact that its provisions are
exclusive with respect to the establishment and determination of all rights,
duties and remedies concerning representation and claims to jurisdiction.
However, this does not preclude the bringing of an action in court for the
violation of a collective bargaining agreement.1"
Questions of representation or jurisdictional disputes subject to the
Labor-Management Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act are specifically
excluded from consideration."
Any interested labor organization, any member of an interested labor
organization or any interested employer may petition the division for
enforcement of the provisions contained in the bill. Here, again, the division
must investigate and may hold a hearing. After such a hearing the division
may issue an order requiring compliance.17
The division may petition the superior court for enforcement of its
orders' 8 and any person or organization aggrieved by a final order of the
division may get judicial review.' 9
The bill's final provision is the usual severability clause.20
Metamorphosis
The bill was introduced in the assembly on January 20, 1959 and was
amended on four different occasions, three of them occurring in the as-
sembly and the fourth in the senate.
a. First Amendment
The first amendment occurred on March 10, 1959 and was by far, the
most extensive of the four. Some of the more significant changes which it
made are as follows:
The language concerning the public policy of the State of California
was changed to make it clear that the representative chosen by majority
vote was the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit. This
is similar to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.2 '
A significant change in definition was made concerning exemptions from
the status of being a labor organization. The original bill precluded groups
"knowingly" financed, interfered with, assisted financially, dominated or
controlled by an employer. This was broadened to preclude groups "directly
15 Id. § 1145.
16 Id. § 1146.
17 Id. § 1147.
IS Id.§ 1148.
19 Id.§ 1149.
2 0 Id. § 1150.
2149 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et. seq. (the sections in question are § 1137 of the state
act and § 9(b) of the federal).
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or indirectly" financed, interfered with, supported or controlled by an
employer.
Of more significance is the fact that the amendment added a provision
that a group purporting to be a labor organization had the burden of prov-
ing that it was "bona fide" if it was not affiliated with a national or interna-
tional labor organization. This provision is important because by definition
a labor organization means a "bona fide organization." Thus if an organi-
zation is not bona fide it is not a labor organization. Carrying this further,
if two organizations are striking as to which of their members shall perform
certain work and one of them is not a labor organization within the meaning
of the bill, a jurisdictional strike does not exist and the strike can go on
forever.
Some employer groups objected strongly to this change, arguing that
it discriminated against independent unions. Labor on the other hand
argued that most if not all so-called independent unions were in effect
company unions-completely subservient to the employer.
The next significant change provided for a run-off election in the event
that no labor organization received a majority.
The language describing the activity that was proscribed during a juris-
dictional dispute was changed from the general phrase "other concerted
interference" to the more specific "striking, picketing, boycotting or work
stoppage." This brought objection from some employer groups for two
reasons:
1. Other forms of concerted interference, such as slow downs, refusals
to work overtime, etc., would presumably not be included under this more
specific language.
2. Under the present Jurisdictional Strike Act, questions of representa-
tion are included in the definition of a jurisdictional strike; while under
this bill, only work jurisdiction disputes are jurisdictional strikes.
Turning to some of the other changes, we find that in the original bill
there were three, not two alternatives open to the labor organizations
involved in a jurisdictional strike. The first two have already been men-
tioned. The third was to submit the matter by mutual consent to the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations for final decision. In this connection, it is
interesting to note that in the original form, if the disputing labor organiza-
tions took no voluntary action to resolve a jurisdictional strike, nothing
happened. The Department of Industrial Relations was powerless to act
and the employer could not go into court for an injunction. This third
alternative was stricken and in its place came the provision that, if the
disputing organizations did not take either of the two alternatives open to
them, the department itself would step in and determine the controversy.
The final change of significance made by the bill concerned the parties
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who could petition for enforcement. As it originally was drafted only mem-
bers of labor organizations or employers could do so. This was changed
also to allow the labor organizations themselves to do so. However, the
word "interested" was added as a qualification for all parties. This is
puzzling since .nowhere in the bill do we find a definition telling us what
constitutes an "interested" labor organization, member or employer. Would
it enlarge the group to include, for example, secondary employers who are
being picketed in accordance with a secondary boycott? The bill does not
tell us.
b. Second Amendment
This was passed in the assembly on March 31, 1959. The only change
which it makes is to exempt from the definition of "worker," newsboys
under the age of eighteen. Why they are denied the benefits of the act while
their contemporaries working in other industries are protected is not known.
In any event, this change could lead to the anomalous, but rather improba-
ble, situation in which two labor organizations were striking to demand that
their newsboy members perform the work and such strike would not be a
jurisdictional strike and thus could continue interminably.
c. Third Amendment
This was passed in the assembly on April 14, 1959 and exempted the
state and its subdivisions from the definition of "employer."
d. Fourth and Final Amendment
This occurred in the senate on May 11, 1959 and changed the adminis-
trative agency which was to administer the provisions of the bill from
the Department of Industrial Relations to the newly created division
within that department, designated as the Division of Labor-Management
Relations.
e. Attempted Amendments
Before turning our attention to a detailed analysis of some of the prob-
lems presented in the final version of the bill, it is interesting to note some
of the attempts to amend it which failed to pass. One of these was intro-
duced by the author of the original bill' and would have eliminated one
word, i.e., "voting." The elimination of this one word would have had far-
reaching effects since it would have changed the requirement that to be,
the exclusive representative of the employees, one needed.only a majority of
those "voting" in the unit, to the requirement that one needed a majority
22 Assemblyman (now judge) Miller. After proposing this amendment on April 8, 1959 he
withdrew it on April 14, 1959. See Assmvsy JouRNAl, April 8, 1959, at 2213 and ASSEMBLY
JouRNA., April 14, 1959, at 2399.
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of those "in" the unit, regardless of how many of them voted or failed to
vote in the election. Thus, for example, in a unit of one hundred employees,
if sixty voted in the election, a labor organization would need thirty-one
votes without this proposed amendment but would need fifty-one votes
with it.
On at least two occasions, attempts were made to include in the bill,
the labor organization unfair labor practices contained in Taft-Hartley.
Also, on at least two occasions, attempts were made to exclude agricul-
tural workers from the provisions of the bill. 4 At least two assemblymen
went on record as opposing the bill "because agriculture is important in
our county and this bill was written without taking into account the unique
problems of agriculture. ' Reference will be made later to at least one
opinion as to the role of agricultural interests in defeating the bill.
In Detail; a Closer Look at Some Provisions; Problems Raised
a. Status of Union Selected Before Enactment of Bill
A major defect of the bill is the fact that its language is not at all clear
in several important sections. Rather than settle anything, this would
force the parties into litigation. One wonders how much of the ambiguity
is purposeful and how much is inadvertent.
One good example of this is the nebulous status of a labor organization
which has been chosen by a majority of the workers in a given unit, recog-
nized by the employer and has entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with said employer, all of this occurring before passage of the bill.
Could a second labor organization demand that a new election be held
regardless of the fact that all employees in the unit want the incumbent
labor organization and have recently expressed this preference to their
employer but without the formality of an election conducted under the
auspices of the division?
Section 1139 says that "if a question of representation exists, any labor
organization in this State claiming to represent a majority of workers in a
unit may file a representation petition with the division." There need be
no showing of interest, nor must the filing labor organization produce mem-
bership cards.2"
23 See ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, April 8, 1959, at 2214 and ASSEMBLY JoURNAL, April 14, 1959,
at 2401.
24 See ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, April 14, 1959, at 2404 and ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, April 16, 1959,
at 2506. Compare the following language of Taft-Hartley (supra note 5 at § 2 (3) "The term
'employee' ... shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer...
25 See ASSEMBLY JOURNAL, April 16, 1959, at 2511.
26 Re the absence of a requirement of a showing of interest by producing signed member-
ship cards, see the new provision added by the Landrum-Griffin Act (Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Public Law 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 at § 704(c)).
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The only limitation contained in the bill concerning filing for an elec-
tion occurs after a certification as the exclusive representative (for the
one or two year period previously discussed). Such certification, however,
only follows an election conducted under the auspices of the division. There
is no provision for recognition of collective bargaining agreements entered
into before the effective date of the bill. Thus, it would seem that all col-
lective bargaining representatives chosen before passage of such a bill
would have to petition the division for an election in order to become
"certified." But a further question arises. Can the labor organization file
such a petition? This is by no means clear, since the language of section
1139 can be interpreted as meaning that a "question of representation" does
not exist unless there are at least two or more labor organizations com-
peting as to which of them represents the workers.27
Perhaps the only safe conclusion to reach on this point would be to
say that it would seem that the existence of a contract entered into before
passage of such a bill would not be a bar to a petition by another labor
organization. The wisdom of such procedure is subject to doubt.
b. Run Off Elections
As previously mentioned, the bill was amended to provide for run off
elections in the event that one of two or more competing labor organiza-
tions did not obtain a majority vote. This was a perfectly reasonable, even
commendable amendment. But again, the language chosen results in
ambiguity.
Section 1142 says that,
If the election involves two or more labor organizations and if the election
results in no labor organization receiving a majority of the valid votes cast,
a run off election shall be conducted between the two labor organizations
receiving the largest number of votes.
Two major problems arise:
1. Will those voting be given the opportunity to vote against having
any labor organization represent them?
2. Assuming that they will have this choice, does the language of this
section mean what it says about requiring a run off election even if a
majority of those voting have voted against any labor organization? After
all, this would result in "no labor organization receiving a majority of the
valid votes cast." Admittedly this would be an absurd result, but it is one
that is possible under the ambiguous language of the bill.
2 7 One possible solution would be to change the wording of the bill to make it similar to
Taft-Hartley § 9a which speaks of representatives, "designated or selected." (Emphasis added.)
While the bill does contain such language, it appears in the section dealing with public policy
(§ 1137) not elections (§ 1139-1143).
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Concerning the first point, although it would seem that the workers
would have the choice of voting against having any organization represent
them, this is certainly not clear from the language of the bill. In fact, one
of the objections raised by employer groups was the fact that the language
in the public policy declaration did not specifically give the worker the
right to refrain from any or all such activities.2
However, by relying on the language of another section, such right
may be implied. Section 1140, in speaking of the election which the divi-
sion holds, says "whether the majority of workers in such unit desire to be
represented by any petitioning labor organization." (Emphasis added.)
This would seem to mean that the worker has the choice as to any or none
of the petitioning organizations. Prudence, however, would seem to dictate
the desire for a more clearly spelled out legislative intent as to whether or
not the worker is to have such a choice.
Turning to the second question, assuming that the worker does have
this choice, if a majority of the votes cast are for "no union" must there
then be a run off between the two which received the most votes even
though a majority of those voting want neither? The above language could
be interpreted as requiring this absurd result. It would be reasonable,
however, to assume that the legislature in its wisdom would require a run
off only if a majority of the employees wanted some union, but were split
as to which one they wanted.
c. Definitions
Although the act contains fourteen sections and covers approximately
six printed pages, there is a paucity of definitions. One good example of the
difficulties encountered due to this lack of defined terms, occurs in the
section dealing with jurisdictional strikes.' It says that once a notice is
issued by the division, any "striking, picketing, boycotting or work stop-
page as hereinabove defined.., shall cease." (Emphasis added.) But the
28 Section 1137 in speaking of "full freedom of association, including the right to organize,
to bargain collectively and to designate representatives of his own choosing for the purposes of
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection" does
not say that he has the right to refrain from such activity. Compare Taft-Hartley § 7 which,
after the affirmative language of the Wagner Act (giving employees the right to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, bargain collectively and engage in other concerted activity) adds
the words ". . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities...
(Emphasis added.)
See also N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, § 102.70 (1959)
which, in speaking of run-off elections, says, "The regional director shall conduct a run-off
election . . . when an election in which the ballot provided for not less than three choices
(i.e., at least two representatives and 'neither') results in no choice receiving a majority. .. Y
(Emphasis added.)
29A.B. 419, § 1144.
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words are neither hereinabove nor hereinbelow defined. The act is abso-
lutely silent as to them.
In fact, only three words are defined in the whole act; worker, employer
and labor organization. Of these, the most important is the definition of
"worker" because the other two definitions are written around it. An em-
ployer is one who has one or more "workers" and a labor organization is
an organization in which "workers" participate.
1. Worker
Looking at this all important definition we see that although the
language is brief, it is extremely broad. A worker is "any natural person
performing work for wages, salary or other compensation on a commis-
sion, piecework or contract basis."3"
Thus it would appear that such persons as supervisors and independent
contractors would be considered "workers" under the bill. The present
Jurisdictional Strike Act uses the word "employees" but does not de-
fine it. The bill's definition clearly goes beyond the employer-employee
relationship.
The term "worker" appears in at least two other places in the Labor
Code but in neither instance is it defined.8 1
2. Employer
This too is a broad definition. It includes,
Any individual or type of organization engaged in any business or enter-
prise in this State which has one or more workers in service under any ap-
pointment, contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or
written, irrespective of whether such person is the owner of the business
or is operating on any other basis, and includes any person and any organi-
zation or association of employers except workers within a collective bar-
gaining unit acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. 2
Although it may not have been intended, presumably labor organiza-
tions would be "employers" within the meaning of this definition 3
Once again, ambiguity rears its ugly head. Do the words "acting in the
interest of" an employer modify "any person and any organization or asso-
ciation of employers" or do they only modify "workers within a collective
bargaining unit"? If the other broad language serves as a guide, then it
would seem that "acting in the interest of" was intended to include all
331d. § 1138(a).
31 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 923, 1682(b). The term "worker" is also used without definition in
at least three instances in the CAL. INS. CODE §§ 144, 927, 1085.
-2 A.B. 419, § 1138(b).
83 Compare the more definite and specific language concerning when a, labor organization
is and is not an employer, contained in the National Labor Relations Act § 2(2).
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possible employer groups, and the former interpretation is the proper one.
If that is so and the bill would make organizations or associations of
employers who act in the interest of an employer, themselves "employers"
this could lead to the absurd situation in which a Chamber of Commerce or
Association of Manufacturers, acting in the interest of an employer, could
successfully file a petition with the division for enforcement of a compliance
order .34
Under federal law, "agency" is the test for determining when someone
will or will not be deemed an employer 5
3. Labor Organization
Since the two definitions given above were broad and sweeping, there is
no reason why this should not be similar and such is the case. It includes,36
Any bona fide organization or agency or any local unit thereof in which
workers participate, directly or by representation and which exists in whole
or in part for the purpose of representation of workers in collective bar-
gaining concerning labor-management disputes, grievances, wages, hours
and other conditions of employment.
In no case shall the term "labor organization" include any organization,
agency, committee or group which is directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part, financed, interfered with, supported, dominated or controlled by any
employer, and any organization, agency, committee or group which is not
affiliated with a national or international labor organization shall have the
burden of proving it is bona fide.
Some interesting comparisons can be made between this language and
the language of the present Jurisdictional Strike Act. First of all, concern-
ing the requirement that an independent group must prove itself to be
"bona fide" (to which some employer groups objected strongly) it does not
appear that this language departs greatly from the present Jurisdictional
Strike Act. Presently, the requirement is that, "the plaintiff shall have the
affirmative of the issue with respect to establishing the existence of a 'labor
organization' .... "'
34A.B. 419, § 1147 allows such petitions from, inter alia, "any interested employer."
(Emphasis added). Thus, "interest" has a two-fold importance, i.e., "acting in the interest of"
an employer may make one an employer and his own interest in the matter may make him an
"interested" employer.
35The National Labor Relations Act § 2(2) originally included persons, "acting in the
interest of ... an employer" but was changed by Taft-Hartley to include "persons acting as
an agent of an employer." (Emphasis added.)
36 A.B. 419, § 1138(c). Compare the somewhat similar language of the National Labor
Relations Act § 2(5). "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, or dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
37 A.B. 419, § 1117.
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Secondly, the bill's definition is both more and less restrictive than the
present act's. It is more restrictive in that the present act uses the words
"in whole or in part" to modify only one situation which will disable an
organization from qualifying as a labor organization, i.e., employer finan-
cial assistance." The bill, however, would use "in whole or in part" to
modify all of the disabling situations, i.e., financial assistance, interference,
support, domination or control.
On the other hand, it is less restrictive in that it speaks of the disabling
situations only in the present tense, i.e., ".... in no case shall the term 'labor
organization' include any ... group which is ... supported, dominated..."
etc. (Emphasis added.) The present act, however, gives a one year retroac-
tive effect to any of these disabling situations. 9
In other words, under the present act, if an action is commenced and it
can be shown that an employer has aided, at any time within the past year,
in financing the group which claims to be a labor organization, it will not
be able to qualify as such. However, under the bill, if the group is not
presently being financed by the employer, it would seem that it can qualify
as a labor organization.
Query, was the changing of the definition to make it both more and
less restrictive, at one and the same time, intentional?
d. Duty to Bargain
Of what avail is it to have all the machinery that this bill provides for
the determination of a bargaining representative if there is no duty on the
part of the employer to bargain? The absence of such a duty would seem
to vitiate this extensive plan. Unfortunately such a duty is conspicuous by
its absence in the bill.
Of course, this absence may have been the result of a belief that such
a duty already existed under the law of California. A detailed analysis of
the cases dealing with this point is beyond the scope of this article. It will
be sufficient to point out that reasonable men could have differed, based
upon their interpretation of the cases.
Such is no longer the situation. In the recent case, Petri Cleaners Inc. v.
Automotive Employees, ° our Supreme Court spoke with certainty on the
38 Ibid. The entire disabling language is, ". . . which labor organization is not found to be
or to have been financed in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the
employer or any employer association within one year of the commencement of any proceed-
ing brought under this chapter." (Emphasis added.)
39 See the last thirteen words of the quotation in note 38 supra.
40 53 Cal. 2d .. , 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76 (1960) (rehearing denied February 24,
1960). At 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481 (349 P.2d at 87) the court reviews three of the leading cases
argued by defendant for the proposition that such a duty did exist.
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subject and came to the conclusion that no such duty exists. They also
said,41
It is for the Legislature to determine whether voluntary bargaining should
now be displaced by a rule compelling the employer to bargain with the
representatives of a majority of his employees.... A host of problems attend
compulsory bargaining that only the Legislature can resolve.
Such a plea should not go unheeded in any future attempt to enact a
new jurisdictional strike act.
e. Appropriate and Appropriateness
Hindsight being what it is, it is perhaps too easy for the critic to sit
back and point out errors. Yet, when one reviews the provisions of this bill,
he is forced, once again, to make a plea for legislative clarity. Another badly
ambiguous provision is that for determining exactly what unit shall be the
proper unit within which to hold an election to see if a majority of the
workers desire representation.
A hypothetical situation would be that in which a labor organization
claims to represent all the drivers working for a laundry and that the
drivers comprise an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. The division has a hearing at which the employer argues that his
whole plant is the only appropriate unit, not just the drivers. The division,
on the other hand, comes to the conclusion that the proper unit is the drivers
and also the mechanics who service the trucks. Query, what is the unit
in which we shall have an election?
The bill does not tell us. In section 1140 it says that the division shall
... conduct such hearings and elections as are necessary to determine
the appropriateness of the unit involved and whether the majority of
workers in such unit desire to be represented by any petitioning labor
organization." This is clear enough. It tells us that there are two things
to be determined:
1. What is the unit and
2. Do the members of the unit want representation?
The next section, however, gives us difficulty. It says that ... the divi-
sion shall determine in each case the appropriate unit for representation
by a self-determination election."
A liberal interpretation of this language would seem to indicate that
the workers shall participate in two elections, the first to determine whether
or not they think that the drivers do constitute an appropriate unit and
secondly, if the drivers do so decide, then, do they want to be represented
by the petitioning organization. Even this interpretation is not without diffi-
41 Id. at ...., 2 Cal. Rptr. at 481, 349 P.2d at 87.
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culty. What workers should vote on this; the drivers, the drivers and
mechanics, or the whole plant? The bill does not tell us.
A further difficulty with this literal interpretation is that contrary to
the language of the bill, the division is not determining anything. They are
merely rubber stamping or certifying the decision of others.
The second possible interpretation of this language is that the division
shall itself determine what shall be the appropriate unit and then the
workers decide whether or not they desire representation by the petitioning
organization.
If the literal interpretation were to prevail, then this procedure is
directly contra to the federal procedure which governs the great majority
of collective bargaining elections.42
f. Requests for Elections
There is no ambiguity concerning who may ask for an election; it is a
labor organization and only a labor organization.43 This is in sharp contrast
to the other two instances provided in the bill for petitions to the division.
In the case of a jurisdictional strike not only may a labor organization
file a petition, but so also may an employer and an employee.4
In the case of a petition for enforcement of the provisions of the bill,
the petition may be filed by a labor organization, a member of a labor
organization, or an employer.4 5
Why then in this third instance should the ability to fie a petition be
limited to only one party, a labor organization? Some argue that an em-
ployer has no legitimate interest in knowing whether or not his employees
either belong or want to belong to a labor organization. This overlooks,
however, the fact that, traditionally, during organizational drives, tempers
are at the breaking point, tension is rife among the employees and produc-
tion suffers.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that if an employer were to be
able to request an election, he might do so as a union-busting tactic, by
forcing an election upon the union at its weakest moment, before it had
consolidated its strength with the employees. This argument is somewhat
blunted, however, by the fact that there is nothing in the bill to require a
4 2 The National Labor Relations Act in § 9 (b) makes it clear that the administrative agency
determines the appropriate unit, subject to minor exceptions.
4 3 A.B. 419, § 1139 says that, .. . . if a question of representation exists any labor organiza-
tion ... may file a representation petition .... " (Emphasis added.)
44 A.B. 419, § 1144. "Any employer whose business becomes involved in a jurisdictional
strike . . . or any of his workers or any labor organization involved in such strike may
petition... 1
4 5 AB. 419, § 1147. "Any interested labor organization, any member of an interested labor
organization, or any interested employer may seek enforcement of the provisions of this
,chapter...." Already discussed supra is the requirement of "interest."
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union which lost an election (assuming that another union did not win a
majority and become certified) to wait a year, month, week or day before
asking for another election, nor is there any requirement that a union which
lost an election must stop picketing. The Petri case makes it clear that it
could continue to picket. Thus, when it deems the time to be ripe it can
ask for an election again and again and again. There is no prohibition
against frequent elections such as appears in federal law.46 The federal
law also allows employers, employees and labor organizations to raise the
question of representation.
47
g. Replacements
Eligibility to vote is another problem that often arises in any question
of representation. Should people out on strike be eligible to vote or should
only the people presently working vote, or perhaps should everyone vote?
The bill is not ambiguous in this respect. It specifically precludes from
voting, anyone employed to replace a striker during a strike. This could
lead to a situation in which strikers, who may never be given their jobs
back, are the exclusive voters to determine what organization shall repre-
sent those on the inside who are presently working.
The danger exists that a few unscrupulous employers might turn a
situation in which only those presently working could vote, into a union-
busting device. They could fire union sympathizers, replace them with
strike-breakers and hold a fast election, secure in the knowledge that the
strike-breakers would vote against representation by the striking labor
organization.
In this instance, the legislature might do well to emulate the comparable
federal statute" which leaves eligibility to vote to the discretion of the
administrative agency. This eliminates making iron-bound rules which are
inflexible and may work hardships in cases which could otherwise be intelli-
gently settled on a case by case basis.
h. Loss of Right to Enjoin
Another significant difference between the bill and the present Jurisdic-
tional Strike Act is that the former makes no provision for an injunction at
the request of an individual whereas the latter does. In fact, the present
Jurisdictional Strike Act allows an injunction not only where a person is
injured but even where he is merely threatened with injury.49
An employer is not as unprotected, under the bill, as might appear at
first blush. In a jurisdictional strike situation, the division must, within
46 National Labor Relations Act § 9 (c) 3.
47 National Labor Relations Act § 9(c) 1(A) and (B).
48 Landrum-Griffin Act, supra note 26, § 702.
49 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1116.
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forty-eight hours, either dismiss the petition or issue notice of a hearing and
if it does the latter, any concerted refusal to perform work, striking, picket-
ing, boycotting or work stoppage must stop. If it does not stop, the division
can get an injunction to stop it. It is true, however, that the time element
here is not as short as that which the employer enjoys under the present act.
In the representation problem, also, once a labor organization has been
certified, all striking, picketing and boycotting must stop. Again, the divi-
sion can get an injunction if it does not stop.
While employers may feel at a disadvantage if they lost the ability to
get an injunction, there is merit in the approach taken by the bill. An
injunction may be speedy and it may stop a picket line but it does absolutely
nothing to heal the underlying problem. As pointed out by Governor Brown
in his special message to the legislature, supra, the provisions of the bill
go to the heart of the dispute and provide machinery for solving it.
Defeat of the Bill
After passing the assembly and being amended in the senate, the bill
was before the Seante Labor Committee. Interest was running very high. As
one report said, "The Labor Committee... held the hearing on A.B. 419
before one of the largest audiences in many years, estimated at upwards of
1,000 persons." 50
As already pointed out, agricultural interests were extremely interested
in the future of the bill since, presumably its provisions would include them.
In the words of organized labor, 51
*.. The Associated Farmers, the Farm Bureau Federation, and other re-
actionary farm and employer groups staged an all-out mobilization effort
against the bill, which crowded the capital with misinformed and misled
farmers who viewed the measure as an attempt to force compulsory organi-
zation on farm workers. The Senate Labor Committee tabled the bill,
thereby killing it for the session.
Conclusion
Although the bill died in the last session, it is far from buried. New
attempts will be made, probably in the next session, to enact a similar bill.
What form should this new bill take? Governor Brown has said,52
Our state law must not be punitive or restrictive. It must assist, not ob-
struct, the collective bargaining process.
It must be fair legislation, impartial legislation, and it must be effective
legislation.
To that statement, this writer can only add a fervent "amen."
5o Vallejo News-Chronicle, June 19, 1959.
51 AFL-CIO, The Sacramento Story 40 (1959).52 Brown, supra note 1, at 3.
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